Algorithmic Cartels: Rethinking Antitrust Law in the Age of Blockchain
Downloads
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.55662/IJLDAI.2026.12101Keywords:
Antitrust Law , Blockchain, Algorithmic Cartels, Finance and the Draft Digital Competition BillAbstract
Cartel development tracks the evolution of coordination technology: from covert gatherings to computer-programmed prices and now to blockchain conspiracy. Blockchain offers an unprecedented anticompetitive conduct architecture, unchangeable, pseudonymous, and self-executing, that turns the very original assumptions of antitrust policy such as intent, trackability, and culpability on their head. Unlike traditional concerns of tacit collusion, which relies on mutual awareness without an explicit agreement, blockchain-based systems can automate explicit coordination without human contact, blurring the conceptual boundary between the two and challenging doctrinal tests. Traditional enforcement mechanisms, rooted in the identification of human interaction or “meetings of minds,” are baffled by decentralized coordination accomplished solely via code. This piece examines the new challenges of blockchain-based algorithmic cartels and outlines how transparency, immutability, and smart contracts can render collusion from a frail pact to an enduring, self-perpetuating system. It also examines how regulators across various jurisdictions like the EU, US, and India are grappling to address these challenges and proposes a forward-looking, hybrid model of enforcement. Leading recommendations are regulatory adaptation through algorithmic examination and levels of openness, technological policing by AI-backed blockchain analysis and smart contracts of compliance, and international coordination for transnational ledger observation. India’s assertive model, as seen in the Standing Committee on Finance and the Draft Digital Competition Bill, earns that label because it adopts an ex ante regulatory architecture through SSDE-style designation and proactive intervention, a departure from purely reactive enforcement. Lastly, the disruptive potential of blockchain necessitates competition law to abandon enforcement by response, implanting oversight into the technological underpinning itself in order to safeguard innovation without permitting conspiracy.
External References to this Article
Loading reference data...
Readership Data
Refreshing Cached Analytics Data
The cached analytics data has become stale and journal.thelawbrigade.com is making a fresh request to fetch the latest data from Google Analytics. This may take 20-30 seconds depending on the server response time from Google Analytics. Please do not close the browser during this time. We appreciate your patience.
References
Thibault Schrepel, Blockchain + Antitrust: The Decentralization Formula (Edward Elgar 2021).
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781800885530.00010
Konstantinos Stylianou, Antitrust in the Decentralized Economy: DeFi, Central Bank Digital Currencies, and Blockchain (OUP 2025).
https://doi.org/10.1093/9780191925504.001.0001
Christophe S Hutchinson, 'The Challenges of Blockchain Technology to Competition Law' (2020) Legal Issues in the Digital Age.
https://doi.org/10.17323/2713-2749.2020.1.32.53
Giovanna Massarotto, 'Can Blockchain Technologies Resolve the US Antitrust Enforcement Problem?' (2023) 25 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 657.
Martin Spann and others, 'Algorithmic Pricing: Implications for Marketing Strategy and Regulation' (NBER Working Paper 32540, June 2024)
https://doi.org/10.3386/w32540
Frédéric Marty and Thierry Warin, 'Deciphering Algorithmic Collusion: Insights from Bandit Algorithms and Implications for Antitrust Enforcement' (2025) 3 Journal of Economy and Technology 34.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ject.2024.10.001
Haishui Yan & Yajun Wang, 'Blockchain Technology and Antitrust Compliance: Data Traceability and Trusted Governance Ecosystem' (2024) Probe - Accounting, Auditing and Taxation.
Thibault Schrepel, Blockchain + Antitrust: The Decentralization Formula (Edward Elgar 2021).
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781800885530.00010
Thibault Schrepel, Blockchain + Antitrust: The Decentralization Formula (Edward Elgar 2021).
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781800885530.00010 DOI: https://doi.org/10.4337/9781800885530.00010
OECD, Algorithms and Collusion: Competition Policy in the Digital Age (2017) https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/algorithms-and-collusion.htm accessed 27 September 2025.
Konstantinos Stylianou, Antitrust in the Decentralized Economy: DeFi, Central Bank Digital Currencies, and Blockchain (OUP 2025).
https://doi.org/10.1093/9780191925504.001.0001 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/9780191925504.001.0001
Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice E Stucke, Virtual Competition: The Promise and Perils of the Algorithm-Driven Economy (Harvard University Press 2016).
https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674973336
Christophe S Hutchinson, 'The Challenges of Blockchain Technology to Competition Law' (2020) Legal Issues in the Digital Age 53.
https://doi.org/10.17323/2713-2749.2020.1.32.53 DOI: https://doi.org/10.17323/2713-2749.2020.1.32.53
Michal S Gal, 'Algorithms as Illegal Agreements' (2019) 34 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 67.
Haishui Yan and Yajun Wang, 'Blockchain Technology and Antitrust Compliance: Data Traceability and Trusted Governance Ecosystem' (2024) 6(4) Probe - Accounting, Auditing and Taxation.
Gal (n 1)
Mateja Durovic and Chris Willett, 'A Legal Framework for Using Smart Contracts in Consumer Contracts: Machines as Servants, Not Masters' (2023) 86 Modern Law Review 1390.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12817 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12817
Zhou et al (n 2)
Niamh Dunne, 'Competition Law and the Digital Economy: Towards a New Theoretical Framework' (2020) 83 Modern Law Review 1191.
Shilpa Singh and Prajakta Kale, 'Smart Contracts and Blockchain: Legal Issues and Implications for Indian Contract Law' (2021) 36 International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 312.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13600869.2021.1999312 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/13600869.2021.1999312
OECD, Algorithms and Collusion: Competition Policy in the Digital Age (OECD Publishing 2017) https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2017/05/algorithms-and-collusion-competition-policy-in-the-digital-age_02371a73-en.pdf accessed 27 September 2025.
European Commission, Antitrust: Algorithms and Competition (Policy Brief, 2019) https://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpb/2019/2019_1_algorithms_en.pdf accessed 27 September 2025.
Jasper Verstappen, 'Regulating Unfair Commercial Practices in a Smart Contract Context' (2024) 15 European Journal of Law and Technology 2.
Xu et al (n 3)
Zhang Xu, Mingsheng Zhang & Wei Zhao, 'Algorithmic Collusion and Price Discrimination: The Over-Usage of Data' (2024) https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.06150 accessed 27 September 2025.
Martin Spann and others, 'Algorithmic Pricing: Implications for Marketing Strategy and Regulation' (NBER Working Paper 32540, June 2024).
https://doi.org/10.3386/w32540 DOI: https://doi.org/10.3386/w32540
Frédéric Marty and Thierry Warin, 'Deciphering Algorithmic Collusion: Insights from Bandit Algorithms and Implications for Antitrust Enforcement' (2025) 3 Journal of Economy and Technology 34.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ject.2024.10.001 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ject.2024.10.001
Case C-74/14 Eturas UAB and Others v Lietuvos Respublikos konkurencijos taryba EU:C:2016:42.
Meyer v Kalanick 174 F Supp 3d 817 (SDNY 2016).
Lin William Cong and Zhiguo He, 'Blockchain Disruption and Smart Contracts' (2019) 75 Review of Financial Studies 193 (working paper version on SSRN https://ssrn.com/abstract=2985764 accessed 27 September 2025).
OECD, Algorithms and Collusion: Competition Policy in the Digital Age 12-18 (OECD Publishing 2017), https://doi.org/10.1787/258dcb14-en.
https://doi.org/10.1787/258dcb14-en DOI: https://doi.org/10.1787/258dcb14-en
Thibault Schrepel, Is Blockchain the Death of Antitrust Law? The Blockchain Antitrust Paradox, 33 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1, 5 (2019).
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3193576
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227-29 (1993).
Roberto D. Taufick, Block Change: The Fallacy of Blockchain Immutability and Cartel Governance, 1 Notre Dame J. on Emerging Tech. 307 (2020).
OECD, Blockchain Technology and Competition Policy 15-19 (DAF/COMP/WD(2018)47), https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2018)47/en/pdf
Id. at 21-23.
Id. at 25-26.
Michal S. Gal & Niva Elkin-Koren, Algorithmic Consumers and the Law, 30 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 309, 319-21 (2017).
OECD, Data Portability, Interoperability and Competition 32-35 (DAF/COMP(2021)3), https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/data-portability-interoperability-and-competition.html.
Katharine Kemp, Concealed Data Practices and Competition Law: Why Privacy Matters, 16 European Competition Journal 628 (2020).
https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2020.1839228
Roberto D. Taufick, Block Change: The Fallacy of Blockchain Immutability and Cartel Governance, 1 Notre Dame J. on Emerging Tech. 307, 329-31 (2020).
Schrepel, supra note, at 42-45.
OECD Blockchain Policy Centre, The Tokenisation of Assets and Potential Implications for Competition 17-19 (2022), https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2020/03/the-tokenisation-of-assets-and-potential-implications-for-financial-markets_370f9853/83493d34-en.pdf.
Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1890).
Michal S. Gal & Niva Elkin-Koren, Algorithmic Consumers and the Law, 30 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 309, 319-21 (2017).
OECD, Blockchain Technology and Competition Policy, DAF/COMP/WD(2018)47, at 17-19 (2018), https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/blockchain-technology-and-competition-policy_55f347f1-en.html.
Mireille Hildebrandt, Law as Computation in the Era of Artificial Legal Intelligence, 33 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 153, 176-77 (2019).
OECD Blockchain Policy Centre, The Tokenisation of Assets and Potential Implications for Financial Markets, at 18 (2020), https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2020/03/the-tokenisation-of-assets-and-potential-implications-for-financial-markets_370f9853/83493d34-en.pdf.
Primavera De Filippi & Aaron Wright, Blockchain and the Law: The Rule of Code 141-43 (Harvard Univ. Press 2018).
https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674985933 DOI: https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674985933
Nicolas Petit & David J. Teece, Research Handbook on Competition and Technology 291-95 (Edward Elgar 2022).
Case C-67/13 P, Groupement des Cartes Bancaires v. Comm'n, 2014 E.C.R. I-2204.
Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 Sept. 2022 on Contestable and Fair Markets in the Digital Sector (Digital Markets Act), 2022 O.J. (L 265) 1.
Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1890).
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227-29 (1993).
U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors 5-8 (2000), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/joint-venture-hearings-antitrust-guidelines-collaboration-among-competitors/ftcdojguidelines-2.pdf.
Competition Act, No. 12 of 2003, § 3.
Competition Comm'n of India, Market Study on the Telecom Sector in India: Key Findings and Observations (Jan. 22, 2021), https://www.cci.gov.in/images/whatsnew/en/market-study-on-the-telecom-sector-in-india1652177923.pdf.
Ministry of Corporate Affairs (India), Report of the Committee on Digital Competition Law 57-62 (2024), https://www.mca.gov.in/bin/dms/getdocument?mds=gzGtvSkE3zIVhAuBe2pbow%253D%253D&type=open.
Thibault Schrepel, Is Blockchain the Death of Antitrust Law? The Blockchain Antitrust Paradox, 33 Harv. J.L. & Tech (2019).
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3193576
Renato Nazzini, The Blockchain (R)evolution and the Role of Antitrust, King's College London Dickson Poon School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series: Paper No. 2019-20 (Sept. 28, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3256728.
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3256728 DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3256728
Katharine Kemp, Concealed Data Practices and Competition Law: Why Privacy Matters, 16 European Competition Journal 628 (2020).
https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2020.1839228 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2020.1839228
Thibault Schrepel, Blockchain + Antitrust: The Decentralization Formula 304 pp. (Edward Elgar 2021), ISBN 978-1-80088-552-3, available under CC BY-NC-ND 4.0, https://www.elgaronline.com/view/9781800885523.xml.
Giovanna Massarotto, 'Using Blockchain-Based Smart Contracts to Enforce the Antitrust Consent' (2022) 24 Columbia Science and Technology Law Review 1, 42-45.
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4016740 DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4016740
Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice E Stucke, 'Algorithmic Tacit Collusion' in Research Handbook on Cartels (Edward Elgar, 2023) https://ir.law.utk.edu/book_chapters/43.
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781839102875.00020
OECD, 'Blockchain Technology and Competition Policy, Issues Paper by the Secretariat' (26 April 2018) DAF/COMP/WD(2018)47, 12-15 https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2018/04/blockchain-technology-and-competition-policy_7fc695d1/55f347f1-en.pdf accessed 25 September 2025.
OECD, Data Portability, Interoperability and Competition (2021) 14-16 https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2021/10/data-portability-interoperability-and-competition_f09a402e/73a083a9-en.pdf accessed 25 September 2025.
Roberto D Taufick, 'Block Change: The Fallacy of Blockchain Immutability and Cartel Governance' (2020) 1 Notre Dame Journal on Emerging Technologies 307, 312-15.
Thibault Schrepel, 'Is Blockchain the Death of Antitrust Law? The Blockchain Antitrust Paradox' (2019) 3 Geo. L. Tech. Rev. 281, 78-84.321asaq.
Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice E Stucke, 'Algorithmic Tacit Collusion' in Peter Whelan (ed), Research Handbook on Cartels (Edward Elgar 2023) 42-46.
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781839102875.00020
OECD, The Tokenisation of Assets and Potential Implications for Financial Markets (OECD Blockchain Policy Series, March 2020) 21-23.
Id.
Id.
Standing Committee on Finance, Evolving Role of Competition Commission of India in the Economy, Particularly the Digital Landscape, Twenty-Fifth Report, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Lok Sabha Secretariat, August 2025, para 1.12.
Standing Committee on Finance, Evolving Role of Competition Commission of India in the Economy, Particularly the Digital Landscape, Twenty-Fifth Report, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Lok Sabha Secretariat, August 2025, paras 1.12-1.13.
Id.
Digital Competition Bill pushed to next year' LiveMint (22 June 2023) https://www.livemint.com/news/india/digital-competition-bill-moca-meity-i-b-parliament-facebook-google-cci-11725782470933.html accessed 24 September 2025.
Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice E Stucke, 'Algorithmic Tacit Collusion' in Peter Whelan (ed), Research Handbook on Cartels (Edward Elgar 2023) 42-46.
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781839102875.00020 DOI: https://doi.org/10.4337/9781839102875.00020
Thibault Schrepel, Is Blockchain the Death of Antitrust Law? The Blockchain Antitrust Paradox, 33 Harv. J.L. & Tech. (2019).
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3193576 DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3193576
Constantine Cannon LLP, Antitrust in the Digital Age: Compliance by Design, Competition Policy Int'l (2021).
Michal S. Gal & Niva Elkin-Koren, Algorithmic Consumers and the Law, 30 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 309, 325-27 (2017).
Supra at 15.
Michal S Gal and Niva Elkin-Koren, 'Algorithmic Consumers and Competition Law' (2017) 30 JLT 327 (HeinOnline).
Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice E Stucke, Virtual Competition: The Promise and Perils of the Algorithm-Driven Economy (Harvard UP 2016).
https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674973336 DOI: https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674973336
Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice E Stucke, 'Algorithmic Tacit Collusion' (2017) 81 Antitrust L J 541 (HeinOnline).
Roberto Taufick, 'Blockchain and Collusion: Antitrust Challenges in the Digital Economy' (2020) 11 J Eur Comp L & Prac 589 (Kluwer Law Online).
Thibault Schrepel, 'Collusion by Blockchain and Smart Contracts' (2019) 33 Harv J L & Tech 118 (HeinOnline).
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3315182 DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3315182
OECD, Blockchain and Competition Policy: Issues Paper (2022) https://www.oecd.org/competition/blockchain-and-competition-policy.htm accessed 27 September 2025.
Standing Committee on Finance, Evolving Role of CCI in the Digital Landscape (2025, Government of India).
Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books 1999) 6.
License Terms
Ownership and Licensing:
Authors of research papers submitted to any journal published by The Law Brigade Publishers retain the copyright of their work while granting the journal specific rights. Authors maintain ownership of the copyright and grant the journal the right of first publication. Simultaneously, authors agree to license their research papers under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0) License.
License Permissions:
Under the CC BY-SA 4.0 License, others are permitted to share and adapt the work, even for commercial purposes, provided that appropriate attribution is given to the authors, and acknowledgment is made of the initial publication by The Law Brigade Publishers. This license encourages the broad dissemination and reuse of research papers while ensuring that the original work is properly credited.
Additional Distribution Arrangements:
Authors are free to enter into separate, non-exclusive contractual arrangements for distributing the published version of the work (e.g., posting it to institutional repositories or publishing it in books), provided that the original publication by The Law Brigade Publishers is acknowledged.
Online Posting:
Authors are encouraged to share their work online (e.g., in institutional repositories or on personal websites) both prior to submission and after publication. This practice can facilitate productive exchanges and increase the visibility and citation of the work.
Responsibility and Liability:
Authors are responsible for ensuring that their submitted research papers do not infringe on the copyright, privacy, or other rights of third parties. The Law Brigade Publishers disclaims any liability for any copyright infringement or violation of third-party rights within the submitted research papers.
Citation Metrics
Published
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2026 Rishi Raj, Mitanshi Khandelwal (Author)
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
Copyright © 2026 by Rishi Raj, Mitanshi Khandelwal
The copyright and license terms mentioned on this page take precedence over any other license terms mentioned on the article full text PDF or any other material associated with the article.
How to Cite
Citations List
