TAXING CAPITAL GAINS FROM SHAREHOLDING IN CAMEROON VIS-À-VIS DOUBLE TAXATION OF CORPORATE PROFITS

Authors

  • Tedongmo Petseteye Christiane Doctor (Phd) University Of Douala, Cameroon Author

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Abstract

The Cameroonian tax system has undergone significant modifications as a result of the search for increased revenue return, particularly in the way capital gains on the transfer of shares are taxed. Although intended to make the system more egalitarian, given the way these gains are taxed, these modifications could theoretically spark debate. The recent increase in the capital gains tax (CGT) rate on shares and the removal of the initially offered incentives are two potential arguments that could be made. They centre on the capital gains tax (CGT) trigger and the mechanism of taxing corporate earnings. This essay makes the case that these adjustments are unnecessary by analysing their justification. Despite the fact that the equity requirement takes precedence, the theoretical justification for taxing these gains may nevertheless require deviating from this rule in order to achieve the goal of raising the revenue yield.

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Published

20-12-2022

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Copyright © 2026 by Tedongmo Petseteye Christiane

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How to Cite

Christiane, Tedongmo. “TAXING CAPITAL GAINS FROM SHAREHOLDING IN CAMEROON VIS-À-VIS DOUBLE TAXATION OF CORPORATE PROFITS”. International Tax Law Review, vol. 1, no. 1, Dec. 2022, pp. 1-11, https://journal.thelawbrigade.com/itlr/article/view/933.